

Chairman Rogers Opening Statement

In the course of three years, the U.S. suffered two of the largest intelligence failures in the country's history. On September 11, 2001, in a daring surprise attack, 19 al Qaeda terrorists penetrated the nation's security, hijacked four airplanes and caused the deaths of nearly 3000 Americans. Not long after the 9/11 attacks, another massive intelligence failure occurred: the assessment of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq was repudiated.

In response, the Congress and the President's enactment of a Director of National Intelligence and a National Counterterrorism Center, constitute the boldest strike at the reform of our national security infrastructure since after World War II when the Defense Department and CIA were created to prevent a repeat of Pearl Harbor.

As a result of 9/11 and Iraq, we learned valuable lessons about our intelligence system including:

- The importance of information-sharing across intelligence agencies;
- The dangers of group-think and an unwillingness to challenge conventional thinking;
- The critical need for aggressive human intelligence to steal secrets;
- And the dangers of under-investing in our national security as we did in the decade before 9/11.

But above all, we have learned that in the new world we face, intelligence is more important than in any other time in our history. In the Cold War, in a sense, the job of intelligence was easier.

We had a static enemy in the Soviet Union. We could train our satellites to stare at Soviet Armaments to foretell of trouble.

Today our national security threats are characterized by their diversity:

- Terrorist groups that operate in the shadows of society across the globe
- Networks that proliferate weapons of mass destruction technologies through webs of front companies.

- Authoritarian Nation-States practicing denial and deception that makes their societies seemingly impenetrable;
- And self-radicalized so called home-grown terrorists who act alone and who may resort to violence without warning.

This broad array of threats makes the missions of the DNI and the CIA more important than ever, and the relationship between the DNI and the Director of the CIA is the most important in U.S. intelligence. We have seen tremendous innovations and successes over the last ten years. Good intelligence has helped thwart attacks, taken terrorists off the battlefield, put proliferators like A.Q. Khan out of business, and, of course, led to the take-down of Osama bin Laden. These successes were attributable to sufficient authorities and funding, attention from the White House, but also integration of all the instruments of intelligence against the target.

Your jobs are to create institutions and processes that enable the replication of these successes.

The DNI should institutionalize greater flexibility to allow the type of ingenuity we saw in the A.Q. Khan operation and the inter-agency collaboration we saw in the Osama bin Laden raid.

Amidst debates about whether a DNI is a leader or a coordinator, I offer a new model. The DNI should be an enabler. This means marshaling our forces against new threats, challenging fundamental assumptions, and at times, it could mean standing aside to allow the operators find, fix, and finish the target.

This is critical as we reflect today on the 10th Anniversary of 9/11 on what we have learned about the enemy. The dominant characteristic is that they are in a state of constant evolution:

- We heard in the years after 9/11 that al Qaeda was only interested in dramatic large scale mass casualty events like 9/11. Now we seem to be facing somewhat smaller-scale tactics like truck-bombs and bombs on airplanes.
- We have heard that there was a debate within al Qaeda on whether to focus on attacks against the U.S. or to hold territory. Elements of al Qaeda now seem to be in control of parts of Yemen.

- There is a debate about the leadership of al Zawahiri. I have noticed some commentators seem to suggest he is a feckless leader. This is of great concern and may indicate some complacency.
- Finally, I have seen numerous suggestions lately that the threat from terrorism has significantly waned, that the terrorists could be near defeat.

These changes in the tactics, goals, leadership, and strength of al Qaeda remind us of the need to challenge fundamental assumptions and to be flexible and nimble as we move forward. We in Congress want to help you meet these threats, and to address these issues. This is the first joint meeting of the House and Senate Intelligence Committees since our joint investigation into the 9/11 attacks in 2002. It is evidence of a partnership between our committees and the vibrant oversight we intend to exercise over the intelligence community. Because we ask the intelligence community to do dangerous things in strict secrecy, the relationship between these committees and the IC is critically important. It is in that spirit of cooperation that I welcome the witnesses, two American patriots, and recognize my colleague, Senator Dianne Feinstein, Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee.

Questions:

- **Director Clapper, let me ask you about the operation of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. In the past I have been a critic of the size of the ODNI. You have created National Intelligence Managers to help force integration across the intelligence community. However, you lack “authority, direction, and control” – the magic words that seem to govern whether bureaucratic agencies will follow direction. Two of your predecessors, Admiral McConnell and Admiral Blair, both recommended a new complement of authorities for the DNI and Admiral Blair has suggested that some of the DNI’s authority has moved to the White House. Do you have the power to get the job done?**
- **General Petraeus, I would like to explore with you this question on the leadership of Zawahiri. Has he always been running al Qaeda behind the scenes? And what is their posture in the wake of the Arab Spring. How are they seeking to capitalize on the revolutions in the Middle East?**
- **Director Clapper, in your opinion piece published in the Wall Street Journal on September 7th, you wrote that not all intelligence systems and networks are fully integrated because “some bureaucratic impediments remain among the intelligence community’s 16 members.” What are these impediments and what are you doing to ensure they’re removed?**