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**Remarks As Prepared*

Thanks, I appreciate that kind introduction. Thank you for lowering your standards and allowing me to speak to you today. I am always honored and humbled to address any crowd with the level of commitment, intellect, experience and knowledge that is out there in the audience today. I look forward to the questions after my brief remarks.

My introduction to intelligence collection and combat training came at an early age. Being the youngest of five sons, I had to constantly collect intelligence to know what the foe – "my brothers" were planning and adapt very quickly just to survive their brotherly "affection". These skills were later refined during my time as an Army Officer with the 7th Infantry Division at Fort Ord, and later as an FBI agent in the Chicago Field Office. All this survival training came in handy during my time in the Michigan Senate and now in the House of Representatives. My father often tells me that my career has been going downhill since I left the Army…No comment.

In preparation for today's speech, thinking about the subject of Intelligence Policy and Acquisition Choices, I got to thinking back to the late 1980's, when I served in the Army. I don't believe we had a single operational unmanned aerial vehicle or operational access to National Technical Means. In those days, I couldn't even have told you what "National

Technical Means" meant. We also had limited real time intelligence in the field, other than what our forward observers or recon teams provided; we were still using acetate map overlays and butcher-block paper for intelligence and operations updates. That was a little more that 20 years ago. Today, we are in the midst of a fast-moving technological evolution in Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance concepts, systems, techniques, and processes. ISR information that only Divisional and Corps Headquarters had access to in my day is now available at the Battalion and Company level and even down to platoons and squads, in near real-time. With these new capabilities also come many questions such as "how do we ensure information accuracy?", and "how do we best, and most efficiently, command and control the multiple assets?" One of the major questions we have to answer as the Oversight function is: "How do we provide, and maximize the value of the right ISR capabilities across entire Intelligence Community while staying within budget constraints?"

I became the Chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in January of this year and one of my first priorities was invigorating the Committee's oversight of the Military Intelligence Program. HPSCI is the only authorizing committee with jurisdiction over both the National Intelligence and Military Intelligence Programs and is the only congressional committee that, by charter, focuses its oversight on maximizing intelligence support from both programs to meet national and defense requirements. We are constantly asking the questions: How are they complementing each other? Is there unnecessary duplication? Are there untenable gaps? As part of this MIP focus, One of my first orders of business was to augment my MIP staff with additional expertise so that we could conduct deep dives into several areas, the first being ISR. With ISR aircraft and other systems accounting for approximately half of the

MIP budget, it is important that we get this right. What is right? The proper mix of systems in an architectural approach that meets the needs of the

IC and the warfighter while staying within budget. That review is ongoing and we are working with the USDI and other congressional committees to develop an ISR way ahead that will provide recommendations to reduce costs while mitigating gaps and eliminating duplication. After we complete this look into ISR, other "deep dives" to follow will include looking into HUMINT, Analysis, and Counterintelligence. My intent for these deep dives is to work together with both Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Vickers and Director of National Intelligence Clapper, and the other committees of jurisdiction in the Congress to develop this approach. The Intelligence Community and the military services have been phenomenally successful in fielding great ISR systems and capabilities in the past years when dollars have been plentiful, but to be perfectly blunt, often those systems and capabilities were developed and purchased quickly to satisfy exigent problem sets. But the right policies were not in place to ensure a deliberate method of systems acquisition approach – a true, disciplined, architectural approach. And that is, frankly, something that, in an age of decreasing dollars, is going to be critical to the future.

In General Petraeus' retirement speech, he said "it is imperative to maintain a force that not only capitalizes on the extraordinary experience and expertise in our ranks today but also maintains the versatility and flexibility that we have developed over the past decade." I totally agree… But, how do we do this with fewer fiscal resources in the future?

I believe we are at a critical crossroads for the Intelligence community. As General Petraeus stated we are a nation that has been at war for 10 years. Much of that war has been an intelligence war. During that time we have developed some outstanding HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, MASINT, and Open Source capabilities. The draw on the nation's treasure has been great, but the need to protect the nation is greater. We now find ourselves at a funding crossroads. Budgets are going down. Our nation's serious fiscal issues are leading us to significant future reductions within the Intelligence Community. We must prepare for, and put together the policies that properly prioritize the investments that we must make, recognizing that there will objectively be some "winners" and some "losers". But we must always remember that every morning, enemies of the United States wake up with the goal of attacking us. Al Qaeda may be down but it is not out. It is adapting its tactics, techniques and procedures to exploit vulnerabilities where it can find them. That being said, I do believe that we can better use our existing capabilities, in a more efficient manner, to meet Defense and Intelligence requirements. I am not saying do more with less.

I am saying that we need to do more by better integrating and synchronizing those intelligence capabilities that are required and that can be afforded. We must do business differently to remain competitive on both the strategic world-front and the tactical battlefield. Senior leaders must develop strategies and evaluate and effectively manage resources in execution of this strategy. As the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said "strategy must match resource to need with a corresponding change in thinking from "what do I need to buy" to "what do I need to do." It isn't about the tool but the purpose!!!" It is the responsibility of senior leaders, and I include Congress in that group, to force the culture to

change and manage the pace of change that keeps us in the OODA *(Observe, Orient, Decide, Act)* loop of potential adversaries.

Let me turn briefly to acquisition specifically. When US forces crossed into Iraq in 2003 the Joint Forces of the United States had approximately 158 operational UAV's. That is a far cry from where we are today with over 2700 operational UAVs of various sizes and capabilities. The growth of UAVs has in many ways been matched by the growth of manned ISR platforms, aerostats, the coming hybrid airships and the improvement in the Processing, Exploitation and Dissemination capabilities of our forces to share and use the information that is collected. UAVs today are supporting National and Defense requirements worldwide with each system now far more capable than that of 2003.

Since the beginning of the Iraq war, the appetite for ISR has been insatiable. Every year there is increased demand for additional manned and unmanned systems with increased capability. There is a simple reason for this increased demand; these systems provide overwatch information directly to troops in conflict and they provide a nearly "unblinking" eye to the IC and operational commanders. I commend all of you, active military, DoD civilians and contractors, many in the audience today, that help produce these magnificent ISR platforms. There is no question that they have saved lives and provided actionable intelligence. But, this has not come without a cost. Many of these systems were developed and acquired outside the normal acquisition system to satisfy emergent needs. They were obtained outside, and often in spite of the "normal"

acquisition system because the “normal” system takes too long to acquire capabilities, the need for which, could not have been predicted in the DoD 5000.1 planning cycle.

Although going outside the “system” delivered us great capabilities in short order, it left us with three problems. The first being that many of these systems cannot be sustained without continued OCO funding. Therefore, decisions need to be made as to which systems become programs of record, which will be abandoned, which will be transferred to our allies, or will be retired. Turning ad-hoc ISR systems created over the past 10 years into formal programs of record was among the key issues raised by a panel of service intelligence chiefs at last year’s C4ISR Conference. To quote LTG Zahner “It was therefore important to take those ad-hoc ISR systems that have been rushed into the field through the Afghanistan and Iraq wars and turn them into programs of record so that those capabilities are sustained against our potential adversaries over the next 10 to 12 years.”

The second problem is that, too often since 2001, we have pushed out the various need collection platforms, and to quote the USMC Director of Intelligence, Brigadier General Stewart, “not the need for processing, exploitation and dissemination (PED) tools.” As, he also said, “We need to make sure any system we deliver thinks all the way through the PED process.” Someone once said that “when PED is overlooked, looking for the right data is no longer looking for a needle in a haystack, but looking for a needle in a stack of needles.” My point here is that we must go back and work hard to get the “backend” exploitation and analysis piece more properly balanced with the “front end” collection piece. This is going to take resources properly balanced with the collection.

Finally and definitely related to my first point, early last decade the Community necessarily at times bypassed the normal acquisition process – usually because it just didn't work. The collective "Us" didn't fix that process then and it isn't fixed today. The Executive Branch, working with Congress needs to re-create and streamline defense acquisition to take advantage of the lessons learned over the last ten years. At this point, one can only day dream about the tolerance for acquisition failure back in the 1960's when we – after some significant failures - put the first reconnaissance satellite in orbit. We were in a Cold War then …. we are in a hot war today. Are we really well served by an acquisition system that takes years or decades to bring new systems and capabilities online? Technology and our adversaries will not wait. Perhaps perfect is, in fact, the enemy of the good.

Thank you for having me here today and thank you for all you do. I look forward to your questions.