

more comfortable looking at talking points as drafted and providing comments than drafting them myself.

RPTS COCHRAN

DCMN BURRELL

[11:30 a.m.]

MR. RUPPERSBERGER: One more question, because I want to be able to go. What do you think the biggest misconception or misrepresentation in the public arena about the talking points and the Intelligence Community performance was with respect to the Benghazi attacks?

MR. MORELL: That they were politicized.

MR. RUPPERSBERGER: I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Thornberry.

MR. THORNBERRY: Mr. Morell, thanks for being here. I want to change the subject I guess a little bit. As others have pointed out, there are a number of allegations related to Benghazi, and what I want to ask is from your perspective, and we are going to talk about this more later today, but from your perspective, what was our base doing there and were they facilitating arms going into Syria?

MR. MORELL: So let me first say, no, they were not facilitating arms going to Syria. I can guarantee you that. They were there doing a number of missions. Number one, they were there to collect intelligence on terrorist organizations that were setting up shop in eastern Libya; [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Those were the three main missions for being there.

[Senior CIA official #6], did I miss anything?

[Senior CIA official #6]: No, sir, you got it.

MR. MORELL: Those were the three main missions for being there.

THE CHAIRMAN: Could you identify yourself for the record, please.

[Senior CIA official #6]: [Senior CIA official #6], Deputy Director of the NCS for FI and CA.

MR. THORNBERRY: Were they monitoring arms that others were sending into Syria?

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THORNBERRY: No connection to that at all?

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THORNBERRY: Okay. Let me ask you this. From your understanding, and again we will ask more about this later, were there warnings given to the Ambassador about going to Benghazi on September 11th from CIA or from CIA folks in the country?

MR. MORELL: I don't know. I will ask the folks behind me if they know.

MR. THORNBERRY: That is okay. We will ask more in our afternoon session. I am just trying to go through some of the things that one hears about.

MR. MORELL: Sir, I do know that [REDACTED] regularly briefed the Ambassador at least twice a week and those briefings included our view from both the intelligence and from the analysis of the deteriorating security situation in eastern Libya in general and in Benghazi in particular, but I do not know if there was a particular warning.

MR. THORNBERRY: But to your knowledge, the Ambassador's trip to Benghazi did not have anything to do with CIA missions, priorities, work?

MR. MORELL: No, sir, it did not.

MR. THORNBERRY: Okay. Last question. Based on your review of CIA actions once the attack started going, trying to get people out, could that have been

improved upon? What are the primary lessons you think we can take from that part of this episode potentially for other places in Africa?

MR. MORELL: Yes. That is also a good question and I can come at this two ways. Let me come at it the first way which is, you know, there have been claims that our security officers at our annex in Benghazi were delayed in getting to the temporary mission facility. We looked very hard at those allegations, Director Petraeus and I asked for a very thorough but quick look at that allegation and we did not find evidence to support that. What we found is what you would expect to find.

What we found is that after our security officers got the call to come help, after they had kitted up, got all their gear on and after they were in their vehicles, they were anxious to go. They were very anxious to go. That is what I would hope, that is what I expect of them, and I am happy that they are that eager to get going.

The Chief of Base I pay money and I have different expectations for. My expectations for the Chief of Base is that he thoroughly assess the situation and make a determination about whether to send that team, and, if so, when to send them. And in this case the Chief of Base, and I know you are going to meet with the Chief of Base later, in this case the Chief of Base decided that it would be a very wise idea to try to find some militia in Benghazi who would be willing to go with us, because at that point the Chief of Base had no idea what we were going to be walking into.

I believe that that was a very prudent decision and I believe that that was the Chief of Base's decision to make, and I have not questioned that decision and I don't believe any of my senior officers have questioned that decision. And as a result, I don't believe -- oh, and as the story goes on here the Chief of Base was not able to find any militia who were willing to go with us. So after just a few minutes, essentially nine additional minutes after the security folks were ready to go there was a

realization that help was not coming and that we were on our own and the security officers left.

So I don't believe there was a delay. I think all my officers on the ground acted professionally that night and actually were -- and actually acted with heroism. So I don't have any second guessing of what happened there.

You know, [senior CIA official #6] actually has been in these kind of situations in the field and if you want to take just a minute [senior CIA official #6] can sort of give you a field guide's perspective for what this is like on the ground. Mr. Chairman, I think that might be helpful to the committee.

THE CHAIRMAN: Why don't we go ahead and do it. Come up and take a couple of minutes, [senior CIA official #6]. Most of you if you don't know you should know [senior CIA official #6]. [Senior CIA official #6] is one of the fine case officers in the CIA.

[Senior CIA official #6]: Well, that part I don't think is accurate. I am an average case officer.

THE CHAIRMAN: You are under oath, too, so I had to clarify that.

[Senior CIA official #6]: Sir, Michael made some very important points. A lot of folks that have not been in the situation where they are in charge in an emergency that is in a military situation or a situation involving violence, sometimes they think the decision that that person in charge, that commander is making is just do you go right now or do you not go, when the reality is there is a lot of choices that you can make in that situation, there is a lot of nuance, and the choice you make can have grave implications for a lot of people.

I have been involved. I have had to roll out as part of a response force and I have been part of the decision-making process on rolling out as part of a response

force and I have been the person in charge. And I wish I could tell you I have done it perfect every time, but I haven't. I have been involved in some hasty roll-outs, I have directed some hasty roll-outs, and it is very fortunate that I didn't contribute to making the situation worse.

But I think our chief in Benghazi did the right thing. The situation of violence, you know, partway across town, not a lot of information, knowing that it could be very bad and choosing to develop the situation, try to get a little bit more information and try to get some tactical assistance before having people launch in the direction of the TMF. I have looked at it a bunch of ways. I think he made the right call.

I have seen situations where people rolled out right away and they ended up having to be rescued. I have seen situations where people rolled out right away and they got ambushed on the way because it was part of an enemy plan. I have seen situations where people got lost, vehicles rolled over, and so forth, and instead of coming to the assistance of somebody you actually detracted from the assistance that they were going to get.

MR. MORELL: It has occurred to me that had the Chief of Base sent them the moment they were ready at that 15-minute mark and they had gotten to the TMF and they had all been killed, what I would be explaining to you now is why the Chief of Base was not more careful and did not try to get some help.

[Senior CIA official #6]: So I think he made a good call trying to develop a little bit more information and a little bit more tactical support before rolling out. It is possible to wait too long in those situations, you know. It is a call the person is making at the moment based on a lot of inputs and a lack of information and some bogus information. But I think the chief made the right call, tried hard to gain some advantages so the response team would have better odds of success and better

command of the information situation. That wasn't coming and then they rolled out.

MR. MORELL: Thanks, [senior CIA official #6].

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Thompson.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mike, for being here.

MR. MORELL: You are welcome.

MR. THOMPSON: There is a media report that there is an internal CIA review of lessons learned from Benghazi, is that correct?

MR. MORELL: Yes, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: What are the lessons learned?

MR. MORELL: Sir, this is important. It is a great question. So when I was Acting Director I ordered two reviews. I ordered a review of our analysis as it related to Benghazi and what the lessons learned were from that, and I shared that with the committee back I think in January.

I also ordered a second review which was a review of the internal process and our internal performance in putting the talking points together. A draft of that review was completed in January, but given the debates about executive privilege and deliberative process that Mr. Litt was so deeply involved in we put that review on hold, because what I really wanted to do was share it with you all, we put that review on hold.

The truth is that when Bob resolved those issues of executive privilege and deliberative process, we should have turned immediately back to the review, finished it and got it to you. We didn't. When the White House decided to release the emails last week, it was a reminder to us that we needed to finish the review and get it to you, and that is what we are doing right now.

MR. THOMPSON: So you are still in the process of doing that?

MR. MORELL: We are still in the process, but I can give you the preliminary kind of bottom lines. One is what I said earlier, we really shouldn't be in the business of writing unclassified talking points. A second is that when we are in this kind of situation in the future, although we would not like to be, but if we happen to find ourselves, then it really needs to be the substantive experts who are at the center of the coordination process, not officers from the Office of Public Affairs or the Office of Congressional Affairs. It really needs to be the analysts, the substantive experts, who are managing that process. And the analysts who were at the start of the process and at the very end of the process but weren't in the middle, they need to be in the whole thing. Those are the basically the bottom lines of the review.

MR. THOMPSON: Have you started to implement any of those bottom lines?

MR. MORELL: We haven't faced the situation yet again. Nobody has asked us since then to write unclassified talking points --

MR. THOMPSON: You have not explained to folks that this is how we are going to do business?

MR. MORELL: No. I think when we finalize the report we will get it to both you and distribute it internally within CIA --

MR. THOMPSON: That is my next question. Are we going to see it and if so when?

MR. MORELL: I hope you will see it and I hope you will see it very soon.

MR. THOMPSON: I have one other question. There has been a lot of allegations, suggestion, questioning, regarding whether or not your activity in regard to these talking points was done to protect anyone at the White House going into -- you know all the drill. But one thing that hasn't been said, at least not here,



during the time that you were deciding what to do, was there any issue raised regarding how your talking points could somehow damage Secretary of State Clinton in the future years?

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: So no one said to you you ought to clean this up because if Secretary Clinton decides to run for the mayor of New York or the U.S. Senate or any other office this could hurt her?

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: Nothing at all.

MR. MORELL: I never heard that.

MR. THOMPSON: Do you know of anyone in any corner of this debate who has suggested that that might be a reason for you to clean this stuff up?

MR. MORELL: I have heard the allegation out there.

MR. THOMPSON: No, I mean when you were doing it.

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: There wasn't any signals from anybody --

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: No winks, no nods, no nothing?

MR. MORELL: No, sir.

MR. THOMPSON: Thank you very much. I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Miller.

MR. MILLER: Does CIA know why the Ambassador was there? Following up on Mac's question, why was the Ambassador in Benghazi that day?

MR. MORELL: Sir, I don't know the answer to that question. I don't know if anybody behind me does. I know he had some meetings.

MR. MILLER: Do you ever wonder why he was there?

MR. MORELL: Yes, sir, I wonder why he was there on that date.

MR. MILLER: Victoria Nuland on page 53, this is the section where she says these don't resolve all my issues or those of my building leadership, does anybody know who the building leadership was?

MR. MORELL: No, sir, I don't.

MR. MILLER: Do you ever wonder who the building leadership was? If somebody said the building leadership for CIA, would you expect that would be the Director?

MR. MORELL: Or me. Yes, sir.

MR. MILLER: Okay. Could you read the quote again about extremists capitalizing? Is that too difficult for you to get back in your notes. You read a note from extremists capitalizing on the Benghazi attack somewhere. I am very confused, but it was early on in some of your discussion.

MR. MORELL: Page five of my notes. Yes. So the point I was making, sir, is that the talking points as written by [senior CIA official #1] initially and as finalized were fully consistent with the classified documents and analysis that we had prepared for both senior officials in the executive branch and for Congress. And to try to make that clear what I read was a sentence from a classified document that was produced on the 13th that went to policymakers on the 13th and came to Congress on the 13th and that sentence was "We assess the attacks on Tuesday against the U.S. consulate in Benghazi began spontaneously following the protests at the U.S. embassy in Cairo and evolved into a direct assault against the consulate and a separate facility in the city." And the point I was making was that that sentence from that classified document, from the classified analysis we were doing for policymakers

was entirely consistent with the first and sentences of the unclassified talking points as finalized.

MR. MILLER: And then we get to the -- somewhere in here where we have got the U.S.-U.N. section. I am trying to follow, we talk about the subject line and all of a sudden it goes to the movie, I mean the video. This is on Saturday morning the 15th. We are still holding the line that -- I read this just because somebody is reacting to a protest in Cairo doesn't mean they are reacting to the video.

MR. MORELL: Correct.

MR. MILLER: And I think there is a desire by some, not you, to collectively say because there was a protest, it got over the wall, let's do this in Benghazi.

I think what a lot of folks in my district are asking is why did we keep going back over and over again, and the question that I really have is a lot of the reporting that the CIA was looking at in regard to the protest was being done in the open media. I mean, a lot of that -- and it was from sources that are really not reputable sources. But yet is that all you had at that point was open source reporting from Egyptian newspapers about what was going on?

MR. MORELL: Well, let me say a couple of things, and, one, [senior CIA official #1] will be happy that I actually say this.

MR. MILLER: Good, because [senior CIA official #1] has been shaking [senior CIA official #1] head like this.

MR. MORELL: I just want to say that the CIA, as far as I can tell, and [senior CIA official #1] will correct me if I am wrong, the CIA never side that what happened in Benghazi was a result of the film. What we said was that what happened in Benghazi may have been motivated by what happened in Cairo, and what we meant by that was the protest in Cairo and the guys going over the fence into the embassy.

That is what we meant.

Now, what happened in Cairo was clearly motivated by the film, but we did not ever say or mean to say that what happened in Benghazi.

MR. MILLER: Real quick, and my time has run out and I apologize, but the Director when he was in this room said that it was as a result of that. He even went so far as to say that it had been put into Arabic language and then was put on this TV station, this cleric's TV station. I mean, he drove that in pretty hard when he was in here. That is what kind of confuses me now, is that -- but he did say that in here.

MR. MORELL: Sir, I wasn't here.

MR. MILLER: Yes?

[Senior CIA official #1]: Sir, the Director read directly from talking points that we had also provided him that day and my recollection, having been in the room, was that he too referred to it as inspired by events in Cairo. In talking about the events in Cairo, we did talk about as well that that film had the potential to insight violence elsewhere because it had been translated into Arabic. It was getting some spread. But, sir, my recollection is that he did not emphasize, he did not say that the attacks in Benghazi, the events in Benghazi, were inspired by the video.

MR. MILLER: Okay. My notes, Mr. Chairman, basically said that he said it was translated into Arabic and broadcast, which is what you said, and then I asked him the question did he see Ambassador rise's five appearances on the Sunday morning talk shows and his response was I think no, he had not seen it, which again surprised me. I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Ms. Schakowsky.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: Mike, I want to ask you, did you feel insulted or diminished by having to take an oath this morning?

MR. MORELL: No, I did not.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: I wanted to just make the point to the committee and to the chairman and ranking member, you may remember some time ago I had suggested as basically an oversight committee that we ask all of our witnesses on other oversight committees to take an oath before they testify, and I didn't -- I am glad you said what you have said. I think it would be a good thing to do in general.

I wanted to make a couple of points. First of all, so one lesson learned, and Director Petraeus made it himself, this idea don't write talking points, I like the suggestion. I think it is a positive suggestion that if we are concerned about explaining, let us write it and then you send it back. I think it would definitely cut down the time, for one thing. We could do it in real time and say no, don't say this. So I think that is really constructive and I thank you for that.

I just want to say in terms of unfolding facts and how they get reported and how we talk about them, I would say that if you think about Sandyhook, for example, there were all kinds of really wrong things that came out initially; that the shooter was the son of a teacher and allowed in, all kinds of things. In the United States, with all of our law enforcement, things change and evolve. And this week when it came to Oklahoma, they just reduced the number of dead there. So somehow the fact that talking points or statements to the press or reports, public or otherwise, change, is the nature of a confusing and evolving situation of violence, particularly in a place like Benghazi. And I just want to make that point.

The other point I wanted to make, revising talking points. Well, we have talked about the process, how we could improve it. But I know in my own office when we send out a letter or an email in response to many calls that have been coming in, it gets vetted through the staff. One of the staff will write it; my chief of

staff will look it over, make some changes; it will go to me, I will make some changes. So this idea that a document has been amended, revised, discussed, as important as this one, I think is absolutely the responsible thing to do.

I appreciate that you said could it have been done better? I think that is true. Could the final product have been better? Probably true. All those things, and those are lessons learned. But I just want to express my endorsement of the idea that it is not unusual for things like that to be changed. I mean, I imagine that that is true of certainly NIE, that they go through many iterations, lots of input, which I think is a good thing.

MR. MILLER: Will the gentlewoman yield?

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: Yes.

MR. MILLER: We are not questioning the fact they were changed. It is what the motivation for the change was.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: Well, actually in the public press that there were 20 different revisions, that -- you know, I do think that the quantity of the revisions has, I am not saying in here, but has become an issue when discussing this out in the public, that somehow suggests that something fishy was going on. And I don't think that ever should be the case.

And, you know, so, again on the question of political motivation, is there -- you know, if we keep digging deeper and we have more hearings, are we ever going to find something? Is there a question that could be asked that could reveal that there was some political influence in this whole process?

MR. MORELL: Ma'am, the only thing I can say is that I have seen no information and I know of no information that would suggest that.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: Thank you, and I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Just to the gentlewoman's point on the oath, this is an ongoing review by the committee, and you and I have had this discussion before, I worry that not every oversight function has to be contentious. This is a review. I think it is important for Mr. Morell. We didn't spring it on him. We also talked to him about the fact that he would be put under oath. But this is I argue a little bit different than the normal oversight function. Again, I don't want to make every oversight function a contentious effort. I don't know if -- this committee has a bit of a unique position here. As part of the investigation, doing the review of the documents, having his clarifying testimony today, we felt it was important to do that.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: I would emphatically disagree and don't think that reflects contentiousness. I just think it is proper procedure.

THE CHAIRMAN: We will respectfully disagree. We agree on so much.

MS. SCHAKOWSKY: We do.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Conaway.

MR. CONAWAY: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Michael, thanks buddy. I appreciate your being here. I had a packet of 11 pages which appear to be a step by step on how the talking points from went from where they started to where they wound up. Have you got that?

MR. MORELL: Yes.

MR. CONAWAY: The last one dated on Friday is 8:59. They appear to be relatively stable throughout that afternoon. There is the reference to al-Qa'ida is taken out. Is everything that went up to the 8:59 version, is that all internal to the CIA? You guys are doing that, or is there outside input?

MR. MORELL: No. So the 8:59, I believe --

MR. CONAWAY: Page 8. And that is the first major one where we strike out

the Ansar al-Sharia. Who struck that paragraph?

MR. MORELL: No. So there were external changes to what is on page 8.

So there is an FBI change in the second bullet.

MR. CONAWAY: Okay. Who deleted the third bullet?

MR. MORELL: And State Department asked that the Ansar al-Sharia material be removed.

MR. CONAWAY: Any reason why?

MR. MORELL: And we agreed.

MR. CONAWAY: Say again?

MR. MORELL: And we agreed.

MR. CONAWAY: I know. But why did they want it out? Was it inaccurate?

MR. MORELL: There was a couple reasons. One is, again there was a desire not to prejudice the FBI investigation by getting out --

MR. CONAWAY: State is asking you that, not FBI?

MR. MORELL: State asked us that.

MR. CONAWAY: Essentially they have gone to bath for FBI at this point?

Anyway, then the next morning we have one at 9:45, and that is where the bulk of the changes looked like they happened.

MR. MORELL: And that would be me.

MR. CONAWAY: So these are your changes at 9:45?

MR. MORELL: Yes. On page 9, right.

MR. CONAWAY: Okay. There was a report --

MR. MORELL: I can walk you through, if you want. I can walk you through every single one of you.

MR. CONAWAY: No, that is all right. As long as you made them. I trust



you were motivated simply because you wanted to get it right, not because of any external contact. I got that. You are an honest broker. I am fine.

What was the CIA's role in vetting the February 14th or whatever that security team was around the State Department's facility? Did you have a role in vetting those guys?

MR. MORELL: Yes. Let me say a couple things and then ask [senior CIA official #5] if [senior CIA official #5] wants to add anything. So we did not, CIA did not have a contract with February 17th.

MR. CONAWAY: Wrong country. February 14th is a different country.

MR. MORELL: We did not have a contract with them to provide security to us. We did occasionally work with them and the people we worked with we vetted. The State Department folks also worked with them, and we did not vet all of those people. We only vetted the ones that State Department asked us to vet. So occasionally State Department would say could you vet this person or this person, and when they asked, we did, but we did not do it as a general rule.

MR. CONAWAY: So the accusation in this article yesterday or the day before that there was an intelligence failure at the CIA's feet, and that was the fact that these security folks didn't perform the way they were supposed to and you guys didn't vet them all on behalf of State and all that kind of stuff, you just simply weren't asked to do that.

MR. MORELL: Correct.

MR. CONAWAY: And as a normal part of the overall country security, State is responsible for asking you for that kind of help.

MR. MORELL: Yes. [Senior CIA official #5], did I get that right?

[Senior CIA official #5]: No, you got it exactly right.

MR. CONAWAY: In this instance State did not ask you either for the February 17th group or the other ancillary groups that were unarmed and kind of wandering around. That is not an intelligence failure in your minds.

[Senior CIA official #5]: That is correct. In one or two individual instances if they asked us to we would check to see if we had any specific information or there was information on cell phone calls, but it was not our responsibility nor did we make that promise to them.

MR. CONAWAY: All right. Thank you. I appreciate it. Michael, thanks for being here, buddy. I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Schiff.

MR. SCHIFF: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just a couple of quick points. The first is this whole incident confirms what we have learned on this committee and that is that Dutch Ruppertsberger creates a lot of mischief. I think that is the first conclusion.

On a more serious note, I just want to say, express my view that I think it is very unfortunate in the political fight between the two parties that the CIA and much of the IC has ended up getting burned when I think you were doing your job, and while the talking points certainly weren't perfect, I have never seen any evidence of any malice or desire to distort or mislead or politicization of the process. And I think it is really regrettable that the IC has been dragged through the mud the way it has.

I just have a couple of questions. One is prior to the release by the White House of the 99 pages of emails, those emails were shared I guess with a couple committees. Do you know which committees those were shared with?

MR. MORELL: Bob, can you? Bob Litt.

THE CHAIRMAN: Would you give your name and title for the record.

MR. LITT: I am Bob Litt. I am the general counsel for the Director of National Intelligence. Those emails were shared with this committee and the Senate Intelligence Committee. They were shared in slightly different form than they were publicly released. You saw a slightly more completion version because there was some information redacted out of the public release to protect individuals names and there were a couple of classified items.

MR. SCHIFF: They were shared with committee members or committee staff?

MR. LITT: They were shared with members, and for each committee my recollection is it was staff directors plus two staffers for each party and leadership staff as well.

MR. SCHIFF: Leadership staff of --

MR. LITT: Of the House and the Senate.

MR. SCHIFF: Of the full House and the full Senate.

MR. LITT: Yes.

MR. SCHIFF: And those staff members were able to take notes on the emails but not actually get copies of them?

MR. LITT: That is correct.

MR. SCHIFF: I ask this because obviously some of those were leaked and some of them were leaked inaccurately. Okay, that is very helpful.

Mr. Morell, you mentioned, and thank you for the very detailed and candid description of the chronology, in terms of removing the prior threat information I think you mentioned that you reached that conclusion independently as well, and I thought you said for a couple reasons. One was you thought it was unfair to mention the threat information without mentioning what State had done in response to it. Was

there another reason you had mentioned the connection? I couldn't recall.

MR. MORELL: Yes, there was a second reason which I was concerned that we would create the impression that CIA had warned about this particular attack in Benghazi when we in fact had not.

MR. SCHIFF: I see. Let me diverge from the talking points because frankly I think we spent way too much time on that and way too little time on hearing from you about how we are doing in terms of identifying those that were responsible for killing our people. Can you give us the intel community's perspective on where we are? There was a press report of five people of interest. There were obviously the three photographs that were disclosed by FBI.

MR. MORELL: If I could just ask both Bob and [senior CIA official #1] maybe to talk about sort of what we are doing to support the FBI because they are really in the lead here. I don't know which one of you --

[Senior CIA official #6]: Do you want to go first.

[Senior CIA official #1]: Sorry. Just a second to find my notes. I want to make sure of the exact number of times we have visited.

[Senior CIA official #6]: Nineteen. Why don't I talk about the support to the FBI first.

As you can imagine, we are trying very hard to generate leads, assist the FBI, identifying people involved in the attack and the deaths of our folks because the support to the FBI is so important and because we lost our people and because we don't want the perpetrators to be able to do something like it again. Since the attack, CIA has put out about 200 formal intelligence reports, raw intelligence reports related to the attack.

MR. SCHIFF: Instead of, because I have very little time, kind of generically

what you are doing, can you tell us how close we are to identifying those either those responsible or those that were involved in any planning of the attack?

[Senior CIA official #1]:

[REDACTED]

and

we continue to assist them on that.

[REDACTED]

MR. SCHIFF: Could I ask one last question on this subject?

THE CHAIRMAN: Sure.

MR. SCHIFF: Thank you. How many specific people who were on either venue on September 11th have we identified? In other words, of the throng we saw in the video, how many specific individuals can we now say we know were there?

MR. MORELL: Let me say I think we are having a difficult time answering these questions because it is really the Bureau that is all over this piece of it, and they would be able to tell you exactly where they are in the investigation, who they have identified, what their confidence level is and whether that person was indeed involved or not, and I think Sean or some of his people would be in a much better place to

answer your excellent questions than unfortunately we are at this moment.

[Senior CIA official #1]: If I could add, I am sorry, one last thing, sir. I would recommend to the committee there was a wire article that was published on 28 March

[REDACTED]

MR. SCHIFF: You said 28 March.

[Senior CIA official #1]: Yes, sir. We continue to look to update it. That is a comprehensive list that was published in the wire. There are no new editions, I checked this morning beforehand. So that was published on 28 March.

MR. SCHIFF: I would just ask, Mr. Chairman, if the FBI is willing, if they can without compromising the investigation, I would love to learn, I think maybe others would too, where we are in the hunt for these people.

THE CHAIRMAN: It is an intelligence-based investigation at this point so they can and have the responsibility to come up and talk to us. So we can open it up to a broader group of members. We will do that at our earliest convenience.

Mr. LoBiondo.

MR. LoBIONDO: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mike, thank you. [Senior CIA official #6], thank you. Mike, how many of your officers were evacuated that needed medical attention and are they still getting medical attention?

[Senior CIA official #5]: In addition to the killed in action, we had one seriously injured officer.

[REDACTED]

MR. LoBIONDO: So these reports of 8, 10, 12 people at Walter Reed, are they folks who were there but not CIA folks, or you don't know?

[Senior CIA official #5]: Well, that number is much higher than any I know. There is a State Department officer who is also injured, the security officer that was at the temporary mission facility that came with us and fought with us at the Annex. He was seriously injured and he also is still receiving medical treatment. But I believe it is outpatient as well, you should check with the State Department. But the numbers are not 8 to 10.

MR. LoBIONDO: Okay. And did you have officers that were not injured but were there firsthand accounts and then evacuated that are back here now?

[Senior CIA official #5]: I don't know where all the officers that were there are. Most of the security officers have been redeployed. For example, our team lead that was in Benghazi is [REDACTED]. So they are all back in service. We don't have folks that are not back in service. I just don't know where they all are.

MR. LoBIONDO: If they would have been asked to come before this committee, would there have been any move to stop them from doing that?

MR. MORELL: No.

[Senior CIA official #5]: No.

MR. LoBIONDO: Okay.

THE CHAIRMAN: And I want to make clear that some of those officers have made themselves available to the committee. And we couldn't work it out for this afternoon, but they are coming up to testify. But part of it is some expressed an interest not to get dragged into this, and I respect that and I won't call them if they

don't want to be called.

[Senior CIA official #5]: But we have made no move.

MR. LoBIONDO: I understand that. You explained a lot about how this was unfolding and the decision by the Chief of Station to see if there was additional help before moving people and so on and so forth. Was there a request made for a rapid response team to be moved in from your folks or from Chief of Station that -- there are reports that there were requests made for help from outside of Libya or outside of Benghazi that folks were told to stand down, we are not sending additional help. And we know that, I don't know how many hours this went on, there is strong speculation that maybe not initially, but by the latter end of this mess there could have been help on the ground.

Did the CIA make that request and can you talk about that being denied or how that was handled?

[Senior CIA official #5]: So as far as the actions in Benghazi, everyone in Benghazi was focused on responding to the mission facility. And then when we were back at the Annex there were activities going on in Tripoli to both get the aircraft there with the additional support from Tripoli station. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]. We have no requests that we made that were denied. I think we have discussed in several venues the limitations of the access that the Department of Defense could provide to us. But as far as requests that were denied or orders to stand down, in no conversation with our office do I have that information.

MR. LoBIONDO: So these reports that we have received that help possibly could have been on the way at least at the latter end of this, CIA was not involved with that. That was somebody else?

[Senior CIA official #5]: I can't speak to those reports. Of the activities in



which we were involved to bring as much help as was reasonable to bear in the time frame we had with the assets available, we are confident in the actions that were taken at the time.

MR. MORELL: So nobody has come to me, Congressman, and said I asked for help that didn't come, and I haven't read that anywhere either.

MR. LoBIONDO: Okay. Mike, thank you very much.

MR. MORELL: You are welcome.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Himes.

MR. HIMES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Morell, welcome. Thank you for being here. I am new to the committee. We haven't met before. I don't have a lot of questions, but maybe one or two. Being on this committee has been terrific. I have been stunned by the competence of the people in the IC and pleasantly surprised by the bipartisan quality usually of the work that we do here. I am disconcerted frankly by this hearing today. It is not at all a mystery what is happening today. You have been enormously forthcoming.

We had a report by Ambassador Pickering and Admiral Mullen. I can't think of people more respected and apolitical than the two of them. It was hard hitting and did exactly what you did, which was identified some shortcomings in how this was handled. We had a situation of great chaos in which nobody possibly could have known what was going on and an intense desire from us and from the American people for information, and you have been very clear that at no point in time were you put under any political pressure. But that is not enough. That is not enough because this is a political moment and some of my colleagues, despite the facts and despite very clear testimony on your part, will, particularly in the context of new revelations if there is pretty outrageous behavior by the IRS, look to just keep this

going, keep this going. Keep this narrative going that this is an over-politicized White House, that they will stop at nothing to advance their political ends. And there is not a shred of evidence out there that suggests that is true, but we will be back because that narrative is pretty important to some people.

And I associate myself with the comments of Mr. Schiff. It is not just that your agency and the IC with which I have been startlingly impressed has been dragged through the mud, but I have to assume that the testimony today apart, from having some of the most senior people in the CIA, probably took several hundreds of hours to prepare, and those were hundreds of hours in which you were not hunting terrorists or paying attention to North Korea or to China or to Iran. So I very much hope we can move beyond this and acknowledge that there were lessons learned and get back to the business of national security.

I guess my one question is we haven't touched much on the question of what institutionally you have done to rethink the cost-benefit, the policy, if you will, as to where you put outlying bases. And I assume this is not just a Benghazi problem. I assume you think about this in terms of Pakistan and Iran and plenty of other dangerous places.

So could you just describe what are the lessons learned and how are you rethinking the cost-benefit of both your presence but also the assets, the security assets and whatnot that are put in place against those?

MR. MORELL: Sure. So we did a number of things after Benghazi. One thing that I did as Acting Director was we have something called a war zone board that meets monthly and looks at security issues among other things in war zones, and I asked that that board expand its writ to not only include [REDACTED]

[REDACTED], and there are a handful of those. So the war zone board now looks at those very, very closely.

Two, the second thing I did as Acting Director was to ask for a weekly update on the security situation, threat situation at each of our facilities that are [REDACTED]. And I get that every Friday, the Director gets that every Friday. It walks through the mission of the facility, why we are there. It walks through the value of what we get out of that facility in terms of intelligence. It walks through the threat. It walks through the trend in the threat. It walks through whether there is any credible immediate threat information. It walks through the security posture. It walks through a whole set of things that I pour over every weekend to make sure that our security is the best it can be.

The third thing we did was we --

MR. HIMES: I am sorry, I am running out of time. Just one question. Has this new process and the things that you have put in place, has it actually caused a change in footprint?

MR. MORELL: It has not caused a change in footprint, but it has caused a change in terms of upgrading security at a number of facilities.

MR. HIMES: Great. Thank you. I yield back.

THE CHAIRMAN: Mr. Nunes.

MR. NUNES: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Morell, I want to talk about the YouTube video just for a second. When was the first HUMINT or SIGINT raw intelligence report that you received in from any country around the globe regarding the YouTube video, that your officers, case officers, assets, SIGINT, NSA.

MR. MORELL: I think we will have to take that for the record, sir. I don't

know.

[Senior CIA official #1]: Sir, if you are speaking of the actual existence of the video, is that the --

MR. NUNES: I am talking about a YouTube video saying let's all go out and protest and invade embassies and attack embassies because of this video.

[Senior CIA official #1]: Yes, sir. It was on the 9th, I believe, sir, the 9th or the 10th, I will double-check the date, we had individuals in the Counterterrorism Center who discovered a reference to the video and the call for a protest at Cairo. That was indeed, sir, the cable that we sent out to [REDACTED] Cairo the day before warning that we had seen this video or that we had seen the calls based on this video for a protest at the embassy in Cairo. So I believe that was the first we had seen of an actual inciting something to happen at the embassy.

MR. NUNES: Can you provide that to the committee?

[Senior CIA official #1]: The cable, sir? I believe it has been provided, but we can do so again.

MR. NUNES: Okay. I haven't seen it yet. Mr. Morell --

THE CHAIRMAN: Excuse me, all those materials are open for review for any Member at any time. Just make sure you -- Darren is the deputy. We have all these materials.

MR. NUNES: Mr. Morell, [REDACTED]

MR. MORELL: Well, it does two things, sir. It collects intelligence on their plans, intentions and capabilities --

MR. NUNES: [REDACTED]

MR. MORELL: [REDACTED]

MR. NUNES: Okay. [REDACTED]

Why is the FBI involved?

MR. MORELL: This is an investigation into who killed four Americans. And as the chairman pointed out, it is an intelligence investigation at the FBI, which means that when the FBI comes to a conclusion about who did this, all the options will be open to the President about how to respond.

MR. NUNES: It sounds like you are not involved in developing any intelligence on these terrorists.

MR. MORELL: What [senior CIA official #6] was trying to brief earlier was all the things that we are doing to assist the FBI in their investigation, and those things are extensive, including multiple, multiple trips to Benghazi so that the FBI is able to collect --

MR. NUNES: But aren't you better suited? I mean, you guys have been doing this now for over a decade. [REDACTED]

MR. MORELL: Sir, we don't investigate the deaths of Americans. The FBI does that.

MR. NUNES: But these are terrorists and we are trying to track terrorists.

MR. MORELL: We are working as hard as we can to try to collect intelligence that we can provide to the FBI to assist in its investigation, but it is the FBI who is actually doing the investigation.

MR. NUNES: Okay. The weapons, you mentioned there were weapons at the Annex.

MR. MORELL: Yes.

MR. NUNES: What kind of weapons were there?

[Senior CIA official #5]: [REDACTED]

MR. NUNES: These are weapons for the people there, for our folks?

[Senior CIA official #5]: That is right. That is exactly right.

MR. NUNES: GRS.

[Senior CIA official #5]: GRS.

MR. NUNES: Okay. But you also mentioned [REDACTED] were there?

MR. MORELL: What I said was in answering the question about what the mission was of my people there, [REDACTED]

MR. NUNES: [REDACTED] ?

MR. MORELL: Absolutely. [REDACTED]

MR. NUNES: [REDACTED] --

MR. MORELL: [REDACTED]

MR. NUNES: [REDACTED]